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HYBRID NON-NATURALISM DOES NOT 
MEET THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE
David Faraci
t is widely agreed that normative properties supervene on natural prop-
erties. Non-naturalists face a distinctive challenge to explain this relation. 
Unlike other metanormative contenders, non-naturalists take normative su-
pervenience to be a relation between metaphysically discontinuous kinds: natural 
properties and sui generis normative properties. As Tristram McPherson force-
fully argues, that discontinuity makes it difficult, if not impossible, for non-nat-
uralists to explain supervenience.1 And it is widely accepted that an inability to 
explain a necessary relation between distinct kinds—at least insofar as that rela-
tion demands explanation—is a significant theoretical cost.
Stephanie Leary argues that non-naturalists can meet this explanatory de-
mand by positing the existence of hybrid normative properties.2 These proper-
ties serve as a kind of “double-sided tape,” allowing a natural property to ground 
a sui generis normative property (e.g., goodness) without violating non-natural-
ism’s commitment to metaphysical discontinuity—i.e., without that grounding 
relation’s holding in virtue of the nature of either the natural properties or the sui 
generis normative properties themselves.3 Each hybrid normative property H has 
two key features: (i) it is part of the (constitutive immediate) essence of H that 
some natural property G grounds H’s instantiation and (ii) it is part of the essence 
of H that H grounds the instantiation of some sui generis normative property F.4
1 McPherson, “Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.”
2 Leary, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities.” Many of the passages from Leary 
herein are offered in response to McPherson’s charge that proposals like hers fall prey to 
“bruteness revenge,” that they offer “an explanation of one necessary connection only by 
covertly relying on a second brute necessary connection” (McPherson, “Ethical Non-Natu-
ralism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience,” 222–23). My arguments can be seen as clari-
fication and extension of McPherson’s objection.
3 Leary, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities,” 99.
4 Leary follows Fine (“Senses of Essence”) in distinguishing constitutive immediate essences 
from those that are consequential or mediate. Except where I rely on these distinctions ex-
plicitly, all mentions of “essence” should be taken to refer to constitutive immediate essence.
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For example, one might claim that being in pain is such a property: that 
it’s part of the essence of being in pain that (a) if one’s C-fibers are firing, 
then one is in pain, and (b) that if x is a painful experience, x is bad.5
Unfortunately, this proposal does not meet the supervenience challenge. To see 
this, begin with Leary’s formulation of supervenience:6
Strong Supervenience: 
(∀F in A)(∀x)[Fx → (∃G in B)(Gx & □M(∀y)(Gy → Fy))]
A is the class of normative properties and B is the class of natural properties. 
Thus, according to Strong Supervenience, for every normative property F, each 
instantiation of F is metaphysically necessitated by the instantiation of some nat-
ural property G. With ASG as the class of sui generis normative properties, Leary’s 
proposal entails:
Hybrid Property: 
(∀F in ASG)(∃H)(∃G in B)[□M(Gx → Hx) & □M(Hx → Fx)]
Hybrid Property does not entail Strong Supervenience. It entails that G is suffi-
cient for F. It does not entail that the instantiation of one or more members of B 
(i.e., of at least one natural property) is necessary for the instantiation of F, and 
thus does not entail that F supervenes on the set of natural properties. The latter, 
Leary claims, is explained by her essentialist metaphysics:
The background essentialist metaphysics explains why it’s metaphysically 
necessary that, if x has some sui generis normative property, x has some 
natural property that is involved in the essence of whatever hybrid prop-
erties ground it. On the essentialist framework, no grounding facts are 
fundamental—they are all grounded in essences. So, no derivative prop-
erty F can be instantiated by x unless x has some more fundamental prop-
erty G and there is an essential connection between being F and being G.7
Leary makes two key claims about F in this passage. First, she claims that F is a 
“derivative property”—i.e., is always grounded. Second, she claims that F is always 
grounded in some natural property. But it is important to see that neither Hybrid 
Property nor essentialist metaphysics entails these claims. Even if H grounds F in 
5 Leary, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities,” 98.
6 Leary, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities,” 80, adapted from Dreier, “The Super-
venience Argument Against Moral Realism.”
7 Leary, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities,” 102.
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one case, F might be ungrounded in another.8 And even if F is always grounded, 
it does not follow that it is always grounded in some natural property.
By contrast, in many other cases essentialist metaphysics does guarantee nec-
essary conditions for property instantiation. Because it is in the essence of H to 
be grounded in G, G is necessary (and arguably sufficient) for H, and thus we 
know both that H is derivative and that it is always grounded in a natural prop-
erty. But this is precisely because the relevant grounding relation holds in virtue 
of the essence of the grounded property. Where the grounding relation holds in 
virtue of the grounding property, as in the relation between H and F, it follows 
only that the base property is sufficient. 
Why, then, does Leary claim that, given her essentialist metaphysics, her pro-
posal entails that instantiation of at least one natural property is necessary for 
instantiation of any given sui generis normative property? One possibility is that 
she is making the mistake of thinking that all essence facts entail some relevant 
necessity. But a more charitable interpretation is available. Consider the follow-
ing passage:
Facts about what is essential of what are autonomous: they are brute in the 
sense that they are simply not the sorts of facts that can, in principle, have 
a metaphysical explanation. So, taking it to be brute that certain hybrid 
properties exist and others don’t is not problematic. The question of what 
metaphysically explains such facts does not legitimately arise.9 
This recommends the following reading. The non-naturalist needs to show that 
there is a possible metaphysical explanation for natural properties’ necessitating 
sui generis normative properties. Hybrid properties provide such an explanation. 
Now suppose there are hybrid properties with one sort of essence: they “tape” 
sui generis normative properties to natural properties. Suppose also that sui ge-
neris normative properties are always grounded and that there are no properties 
that “tape” sui generis normative properties to themselves or to other non-natural 
properties. Given those suppositions, Strong Supervenience holds as a universal 
generalization—indeed, a necessary one, given that it is a generalization from 
essences. And since essence facts do not admit of explanation, the explanatory 
buck stops here.
This reading is more charitable, but the argument fails. If we grant the au-
tonomy of essence, it follows that we cannot raise questions about facts of the 
8 Leary might argue that if “x is F” is grounded, then for all y, “y is F” is grounded. But there 
is little reason to think this when the grounding relation holds in virtue of the essence of the 
grounding property.
9 Leary, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities,” 102.
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form “Y is part of the essence of H.” But it does not follow that we cannot raise 
questions about facts of the form “There are no properties with essence Z.” Cru-
cially, it is a fact of this latter sort we are concerned with, not the former. The 
non-naturalist is challenged to explain why it is impossible for normative prop-
erties to be ungrounded or fully grounded in other non-natural properties. With 
respect to Leary’s proposal, this prompts the questions: (i) why is it impossible 
for there to be sui generis normative properties that are ungrounded, and (ii) why 
is it impossible for there to be properties whose essence it is to ground sui generis 
normative properties, but which are themselves ungrounded or fully grounded 
in other non-natural properties? These questions remain unanswered. 
Here, Leary might double down on the above reading, insisting that the au-
tonomy of essence entails that facts about which essences are impossible are also 
brute. But this is not the case. Consider:
Prime: No number has the essence: (i) is greater than 2; (ii) is prime; (iii) 
is even.
Suppose someone were to claim that any demand to explain Prime is both suf-
ficiently met and can only be met by listing the prime numbers and noting that 
none of those greater than 2 are even. This would be doubly mistaken. This re-
sponse does not meet the explanatory demand in question, for the fact that the 
prime numbers greater than 2 are all odd is precisely what we are being called 
to explain. Moreover, an explanation is available: prime numbers are divisible 
exactly by themselves and 1, but all even numbers greater than 2 are divisible by 
at least themselves, 1, and 2.
To better understand how this explanation works, it will be useful to mark 
the distinction between constitutive and consequential essences. Q is part of the 
constitutive essence of W if Q is essential to W but is “not had in virtue of being 
a consequence of some more basic essential properties” of W.10 R is part of the 
consequential essence of W if R is essential to but not constitutive of W. Prime 
claims that a certain constitutive essence is impossible. This turns out to be true 
because the negation of one of the listed features, evenness, is entailed by the 
essences of the other two, primeness and being greater than 2—i.e., there are no 
even prime numbers greater than 2 because oddness is part of the consequential 
essence of being a prime number greater than 2.
In the case of Prime, all of this is a matter of logical necessity. In other cases, 
the explanation is metaphysical. Consider:
10 Fine, “Senses of Essence,” 57.
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Color: No object has the essence: (i) is red all over; (ii) is green all over.
Like Prime, Color is a claim about the impossibility of a certain constitutive 
essence that is true in virtue of the consequential essences of its parts: colors 
are metaphysically incompatible, such that red metaphysically necessitates not-
green and vice versa. Crucially, these explanations do not violate the autonomy 
of constitutive essence; no explanation is offered for the essences of primeness, 
oddness, redness, or greenness.
These cases demonstrate that the impossibility of at least some constitutive 
essences can be explained, either logically or metaphysically, without violating 
the autonomy of constitutive essence. By contrast, Leary asks us to accept that 
the following neither can be explained nor demands explanation:
Natural Grounds: No property has the essence: (i) grounds or is identical 
to a sui generis normative property; (ii) is not grounded in any natural 
property.11
We should reject her request. First, we have good reason to think that Natural 
Grounds in particular is explicable. Return to Prime and Color. These can be stat-
ed as universal generalizations. But our knowledge of them does not proceed via 
generalization; we do not need to know what the prime numbers are, or what 
the red and green objects are, to know that Prime and Color are true. The best 
explanation for this ability is that we (implicitly or explicitly) recognize that they 
are true in virtue of the nature of the properties they concern. Given this, even 
if the explanation offered above were not readily apparent, we would have good 
reason to suspect that such a further explanation is available, that Prime and Col-
or are not merely true in virtue of which particular numbers are prime and which 
particular objects are red and green.
The same is true of Natural Grounds. We do not know Natural Grounds is 
true by generalization from our knowledge of particular supervenience relations 
(and definitely not by knowing which hybrid properties exist!). The superve-
nience of the normative on the natural is a point of much broader agreement 
than which things are (e.g.) good and bad. And most of us are confident that 
supervenience holds regardless of our level of uncertainty about which things 
are good and bad. Again, this seems best explained by our (implicit or explicit) 
recognition that Natural Grounds is true in virtue of the nature of the related 
properties themselves, of the natural and sui generis normative properties. In-
deed, this is precisely the sort of explanation that other views in normative meta-
11 The “is identical to” disjunct accommodates the possibility that some sui generis normative 
properties are ungrounded.
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physics provide—e.g., for some naturalists, that natural properties feature in the 
essences of normative properties.12
What is more, we have good reason to think that all claims of the impossibili-
ty of constitutive essences are explicable. This is because it is eminently plausible 
that the possible elements of essences are infinitely re-combinable, except where 
those elements logically or metaphysically exclude one another. Consider an 
analogy with concepts—a particularly apt analogy, given that essential necessity 
is often taken to be analogous to analyticity. In general, we expect conceptual el-
ements to be similarly re-combinable. We accept the impossibility of the concept 
unmarried married person because its elements are clearly inconsistent. But 
suppose some theory holds that the concept unmarried tall person is im-
possible. This demands explanation. And it should be clear that the theory can-
not sidestep this demand by claiming that conceptual content is autonomous.
This last point shows us why hybrid non-naturalism not only fails to meet the 
supervenience challenge, but should not even be taken to have made progress 
with respect to it.13 True, hybrid non-naturalism explains how natural properties 
could necessitate sui generis normative ones. But this leaves Natural Grounds un-
touched. I have suggested that, if Natural Grounds is true, it must be so because 
the combination it denies—grounding or being a sui generis normative property, 
but not being grounded in any natural property—is ruled out by some logical or 
metaphysical relation between those elements. But precisely what motivated the 
hybrid view was acceptance of critics’ claim that non-naturalism is incompatible 
with the existence of such logical or metaphysical relations between natural and 
sui generis normative properties. 
My personal inclination is to think that this is a problem with non-naturalism 
itself, in which case hybrid non-naturalism’s limited victory here is Pyrrhic, since 
the overarching challenge cannot be met. But if, instead, the problem is essen-
12 Though for important concerns about this explanation, see Mitchell, “Mixed Up about 
Mixed Worlds?”
13 See Elliott (“How to Make Progress against the Supervenience Challenge”) for arguments 
that Leary does make progress. As will be clear from what follows, I agree with him that she 
makes progress in one sense: we can separate out Strong Supervenience into necessary and 
sufficient conditions, and Leary’s account explains the sufficient condition. But I see this as 
a Pyrrhic victory, at best, since her proposal seems to make explaining the necessary condi-
tion impossible.
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tialist metaphysics, hybrid non-naturalism makes progress only inasmuch as it 
takes one step forward, two steps back.14
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